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Public policies for wellbeing with justice: 
A theoretical discussion based on capabilities and 
opportunities 
 
Jaya Krishnakumar  ·  Ricardo Nogales 
 
 
Abstract:  This article presents a theoretical framework that combines virtues and strengths of the 
Capability Approach (CA) and Equality of Opportunity (EOp) approach for analyzing public 
policies that aim to improve individual wellbeing and social justice. We show that neither 
approach is sufficient on its own for this goal. It is particularly useful to combine the two 
approaches because the CA offers a positive way of thinking about what wellbeing is, while the 
EOp Approach provides more formal insights on how to configure public policies to achieve social 
justice and increase individual wellbeing from a normative perspective. We make the case that 
EOp in its original (ex-post) conception is too heavily centered on lifestyle outcomes and oblivious 
to individual heterogeneity. However, we argue that it contains elements that are compatible with 
the CA rationale from an ex-ante point of view. Individual efforts play a crucial conceptual role in 
our proposed combination because they influence and are influenced by individual capabilities. 
Our optimal policy for improving wellbeing with EOp is one that aims to equalize expected 
capabilities across different groups, characterized by circumstances, through a maximin 
algorithm. We provide a technical analysis of our optimal policy taking into account the influence 
of circumstances and policies on efforts and capabilities. 
 
Keywords: Capability Approach, equality of opportunity, individual wellbeing, public policies. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
"If one is to intervene, then the significant life chances that people have constitute a key 
variable on which the State should focus” (Anand et al., 2005; p4 including emphasis). 
Today, the increase of collective wellbeing combined with justice is perceived as an essential 
ingredient of any development paradigm and it is not an exaggeration to say that its importance 
is steadily increasing. Perhaps an interesting reflection of the consensus that this paradigm enjoys 
in the international arena is the UN’s set of Millennium Development Goals (MDG; Kabeer, 
2010), which not only advanced the idea that wellbeing is multidimensional in nature but also 
included some aspects of equality and fairness among its goals. All current dialogues on the post-
2015 agenda, such as the 2013 Rio+20 summit, the 2014 Beyond 2015 meeting of CSO’s in South 
Africa and the UN’s High Level Panel on post-2015 Development Agenda, are converging 
towards the need for emphasizing even further in future agendas the sustainability and social 
justice dimensions of development. Even in countries that currently articulate public policies 
around some seemingly alternative conceptions of development, such as Bolivia with its Vivir 
Bien (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2006), Ecuador with its Buen Vivir (SENPLADES, 
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2009) or Bhutan with its Gross National Happiness (Ura, Alkire, Zangmo & Wangdi, 2012), the 
improvement of collective wellbeing and its just distribution remains the common goal. 
The goal may be a common one, but of course the means prescribed by governments and 
international organizations are different because needs, priorities, contexts and concerns are also 
different. Tax regime changes, conditional transfers, offers of public health services and goods, 
better nutrition, improvements in education and social security regulations are among the 
various recipes utilized to allow people to achieve better states of wellbeing and social justice. 
The natural heterogeneity of societies has always forced discussions around appropriate ways to 
foster wellbeing through public policies to be quite controversial (see for example Ravallion, 
2010, 2012).  
There are, however, some international theoretical agreements upon such issues of a 
normative nature. Many modern internationally accepted frameworks for the assessment of 
wellbeing are grounded on the Capability Approach (Sen, 1985, 1999, abbreviated CA), which is 
deeply influential amongst development scholars and in political spheres. Well-known 
initiatives such as UNDP’s Human Development Index (Anand & Sen, 1993; Haq, 1999; Sen, 
1999), OPHI’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire & Foster, 2011) and the MDGs have been 
theoretically linked to the CA. The CA has also been the theoretical stepping-stone for research 
on novel methodologies for its operationalisation in recent years (see e.g. Anand, Krishnakumar 
& Tran, 2010; Anand, Santos & Smith, 2007; Anand et al., 2009 ; Kuklys, 2005; Krishnakumar, 
2007; Krishnakumar & Ballón, 2008; Simon et al., 2013). This approach is rightfully praised for its 
positive way of thinking about what individual wellbeing is (Sen 1985, 1999, 2009); its contribution 
to policies for improving wellbeing is much more humble. On this matter, Robeyns (2003) states, 
“… the CA is an approach to interpersonal comparisons which argues for functionings 
and capabilities as the relevant evaluative space, where each application (be it theoretical 
or empirical) can, and probably has to, be supplemented with other theories. These 
other theories are normative theories (for example a normative theory of choice or a theory 
on the normative relevance of class, gender or race), which are in turn based on positive 
theories of human behavior and agency and societal process.” (pp. 45-46, emphasis own).  
Although powerful, the theoretical approach that is the core foundation of modern wellbeing 
analyses was not conceived to give insights about ways to improve wellbeing with justice 
through policymaking. The CA does not explicitly advocate for any specific public intervention 
or algorithm in the quest for increased social justice and hence it is not a normative theory in that 
sense. In fact it strongly recommends a context and time-dependent assessment of the relevant 
wellbeing dimensions and their relative importance (Anand, Hunter & Smith, 2005; Arneson, 
1989; Robeyns, 2006).  However, when thinking of public policies, supplementing the CA is an 
issue that should not be left lingering. Inspired by Fleurbaey (2007), we make the case that when 
aiming at fostering wellbeing with justice, policymakers inevitably face two fundamental 
questions: 
1) While pursuing increases in collective wellbeing with justice, what is it that needs to 
be less unequal?  
2) Amongst a very broad set of feasible situations, which social states are better/more 
just and should be promoted by public action?  
Answers to both questions are needed for effective policymaking. However, these answers are 
never straightforward, because the very concepts of wellbeing and social justice are intrinsically 
normative and tightly linked to ethical reasoning. It is such a complex matter that, as we have 
established, one single theory, even as sound as the CA, has proven incapable of giving precise 
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answers to both questions. Following the above quotation from Robeyns, the CA goes as far as 
bringing about an answer to the first question that we have raised, in the way of clearly stating 
that reduction (even elimination) of capability deprivation is required for a less unequal state of 
affairs.  
There is, however, another influential theoretical framework for policymaking, namely the 
Equality of Opportunity Approach (Roemer 1998, abbreviated EOp), that has rapidly gained 
recognition over recent years and that has the potential of bringing a sound answer to the second 
question that we have raised. The EOp offers well established formal insights on what should be 
done in order to achieve social justice from a normative perspective, saying that one needs to 
eliminate the influence of circumstances beyond one’s control in the process of achieving a 
desired outcome. This approach, however, has always been rather nuanced around what 
individual wellbeing is (Vellentyne, 2005), so it seems to have the potential of bringing about an 
answer to the second question only. For an operationalisation of EOp in the context of optimal 
taxation see Roemer et al. (2003); for evaluations of public policies for children´s health see 
Jacquet and Van de Gaer (2011) and Van de Gaer, Vandenbossche & Figueroa (2013); for an 
identification of fair and unfair income inequalities in Latin America see Bourguignon, Ferreira 
and Menéndez (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2008). 
Thus we see powerful complementarities between the two approaches, as one excels where 
the other one comes short. There are still few attempts to build a framework combining CA and 
EOp for analyzing policies for wellbeing at the empirical level: two recent attempts are 
Krishnakumar and Wendelspeiss (2011) and Wendelspeiss (2013). One has to acknowledge that 
there are notable similarities between the two approaches (Vallentyne, 2005; Igersheim, 2006), 
which have often led scholars to perceive that they provide similar elements of analysis 
regarding wellbeing and social justice and do not advance a theoretical combination. However, 
as stated by Chiappero Martinetti1 (2009), there are also substantial conceptual and practical 
differences between the two approaches, as the mechanisms that lead to personal lifestyle 
outcomes and wellbeing, and their possible links to public policies, are quite different from one 
theory to the other.  
In this paper, we defend the idea that combining these theories sheds new and useful light 
to understand wellbeing and its relation to public policies because of the way they complement 
positive and normative reasoning, giving answers to both our questions. Throughout this 
document, we make the case that neither CA nor EOp, on its own, presents a combination of 
wellbeing and justice that can provide formal policy guidelines for improving wellbeing with 
justice through an appropriate optimality principle. We present arguments in search of clear 
answers to both our questions and show that an ordered integration of elements from both 
approaches leads to a plausible solution. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present some basic statements of Sen’s and 
Roemer’s theories, briefly recalling their essentials. In sections 3 and 4 we analyze plausible 
responses to the two questions raised in these introductory paragraphs, respectively, around the 
CA and the EOp approach.  In section 5 we propose a theoretical combination as well as a 
technical derivation of our optimal policy and illustrate its usefulness. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Chiappero Martinetti analyzes differences and similarities between the two theories but never attempts a 
combination. 
Public policies for wellbeing with justice  
Krishnakumar & Nogales 
 
www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 47 
2. Brief Review of Basic Statements of Sen and Roemer 
In modern development economics literature, Sen’s and Roemer’s theories are often categorized 
within the same framework of wellbeing and social justice contributions (Vallentyne, 2005). 
Indeed, there are clear similarities between them. They both have origins in criticism of 
utilitarianism and a monetary approach to wellbeing, i.e. only consideration of personal 
satisfaction or wealth as measures of personal wellbeing, and coincide in advocating that 
attention be paid to other aspects that make up an individual’s life, such as the nature of her 
occupation, living conditions, health status, education, the social and institutional setup, etc. Both 
theories have philosophical origins in Rawls’ principles for social justice (Rawls 1971; 1999): 
everyone is entitled to an adequate set of liberties, so long as they are compatible with the same 
liberties for others; and everyone is entitled to a fair equality of opportunities. They also coincide 
in acknowledging that one should go beyond outcome indicators and rather look at the 
underlying choice sets and circumstances.  
However, the CA’s strength relies in helping to understand better what individual wellbeing is, 
i.e. it is a positive theory of wellbeing, whereas the EOp contributes greatly to the ways for 
improving individual wellbeing with justice, i.e. it is a normative theory of policymaking. Let us 
briefly recall the fundamentals of each theory to support this idea and bring out the different 
elements of an answer to our guiding questions. 
 
2.1 Essentials of the Capability Approach 
Sen’s CA has become a very important theory in modern economic studies, defining what we 
currently understand as human development (see for example, Anand et al., 2005). In this 
approach, human development and wellbeing are related to the sets of doings and beings from 
which a person has the ability to choose; the notions of liberty and freedom are of paramount 
importance within Sen’s theory. In order to understand the richness and the broad way of 
thinking offered by the CA, it is key to briefly recall the distinctions among the different key 
concepts of Resources/Means, Functionings and Capabilities.    
Functionings are life states and activities, objective and subjective (Vallentyne, 2005; Alkire, 
2013), that are willingly and freely chosen, given a set of means and resources as well as social, 
political, family and cultural conditions. Capabilities are the set of all potential (feasible) 
functionings from which a person can freely chose. Thus, capabilities determine achieved 
functionings by a process of free choice by the individual in a particular setting. Capabilities are 
essentially unobservable, since they regroup possible non-materialized functionings with the 
effectively realized ones. Within this approach, an individual’s wellbeing is increased when her 
capabilities are increased, as the latter have an intrinsic value in terms of the freedom to choose 
a valued life. 
Capabilities are personal and individually formed by ‘converting’ the means and resources 
a person has, which include social and cultural characteristics, public/private endowments, 
commodities, services, norms, etc. (Comim, 2001). The conversion process for the internalization 
of these resources and means is personal and heterogeneous (Chiappero Martinetti & Salardi, 
2008).  
Thus, the approach is essentially ethically individualistic (Robeyns, 2006) in the sense that it 
puts the human being’s freedom to choose at the heart of any wellbeing assessment, over and 
above considerations at a group level or governmental actions.  
Figure 1 below presents a diagram that summarizes the above statements regarding the 
process of construction of an individual’s wellbeing within the CA. The capability set for a 
generic individual i is formally expressed as follows (Sen, 1985):  
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𝑄𝑖 = {𝑏𝑖 | 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖)) }                                                       (1) 
with the notations being defined in the diagram below. 
 
Figure 1: Capability Approach in a diagram 
 
 
We denote as b*i the vector of achieved functionings, which is a particular vector-element of 𝑄𝑖 
chosen by the individual.  
The approach’s concentration on individual heterogeneity is evident and marks one of its 
most celebrated contributions to social justice literature. Nevertheless, the approach does not fail 
to recognize the importance of social constructions and relations for the whole process leading 
to the determination of these freedoms, such as legal rights, family history, culture and religion. 
Public policies are a part of these pertinent surrounding conditions that shape an individual’s 
wellbeing, yet, as we have shown, the CA is almost silent concerning what kind of public actions 
are better for increasing individual wellbeing, while fostering social justice at the same time. 
 
2.2 Essentials of the Equality of Opportunity Approach 
Roemer’s EOp approach has become a recognized pillar of normative public policymaking and 
assessment. It has introduced a way of thinking about public policy that is coherent with 
economic development ‘with justice’, promoting the equalization of life chances amongst 
individuals, arguing that an individual’s lifestyle should be a function of her effort and choices, 
but not of characteristics she cannot or could not control.  
Indeed, the EOp approach builds on the differentiation of aspects that are beyond an 
individual’s control but influence her lifestyle outcomes or advantages, called circumstances, from 
aspects that have their origin in autonomous and willingly taken decisions that also exert such 
an influence, which Roemer proposes to call efforts. In the EOp approach, people sharing the 
same circumstances are grouped within a type. The lifestyle outcomes observed in a type 
constitute the achievable advantages for any member of the type and constitute their – common 
– Opportunities Set. Within a type, differences in outcomes can be attributed only to differences 
in efforts and constitute ethically acceptable differences between personal lifestyles.  
Although not originally proposed by Roemer (1998), many groundbreaking empirical 
operationalizations of the EOp approach have successfully proven that one needs to take into 
account the fact that individual effort is significantly influenced by circumstances (Bourguignon 
et al., 2007; Ferreira & Gignoux, 2008). Building on Bourguignon et al. (2007), we propose the 
schematic representation of the EOp approach given in Figure 2 below for a generic individual i. 
 
  
    Capability Set: Qi 
Vector of  Achieved 
Functionings: b*i Means/Resources: xi 
Pertinent 
Surrounding 
Conditions: zi 
Personal 
Choice: fi 
Conversion 
Process: ci 
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Figure 2: Equality of Opportunity Approach in a diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram in Figure 2 can be translated into the following system of equations: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝑒𝑖, 𝑝)                                                                  (2) 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑥𝑖)                                                                        (3) 
Within a given type 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 , characterized by some particular circumstance variables say, 
gender or ethnicity, advantages yi,t are a function of the degree or amount of effort exerted ei,t  and 
public policies pt, which could be thought to be type specific (Roemer, 1998) i.e. 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡(𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 𝑝𝑡). 
As effort is hard to observe directly, one can consider a distribution of efforts within each type t 
and divide it into centiles, identifying the level of effort, or relative effort, exerted by each 
individual in this type compared to all the other individuals within the same type.  Since, within 
a type, differences in outcomes are attributable only to difference in degree of effort exerted, the 
effort distribution is conceptually merged to that of the outcomes of the type. Because of this 
perfect correspondence, it is possible to represent the outcomes of type t as 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡(𝜋, 𝑝𝑡), where 
𝜋 is a centile of the effort distribution. 
The EOp advocates for the recognition of the ethical fact that an individual should not be 
held responsible for what is beyond her control and/or choice; thus individual responsibility and 
absence of impact of circumstances beyond control are put upfront in the assessment of a 
person´s lifestyle (Igersheim, 2006). It is around this recommendation that the EOp approach has 
managed to develop a practical and logical formalization for policymaking yielding several 
empirical studies on optimal public interventions for social justice (Cogneau & Gignoux, 2008; 
Jacquet & Van de Gaer, 2011; Van de Gaer et al. 2013; Roemer et al., 2003). However, we have 
established that, while concentrating on normative aspects, this approach does not present an 
enriched positive concept of individual wellbeing.  
 
3. While pursuing increased collective wellbeing with justice, what is it that needs to be 
less unequal? 
Evidently, this question is far from being novel, but different answers are still in debate (cf. e.g. 
Ruggeri-Laderchi, Saith & Stewart, 2003). Amongst others, in 1980, Sen had famously analyzed 
it in one of his most influential academic pieces, “Equality of What?” and within his remarkable 
series of academic contributions a path-setting answer was given: capabilities.  
From the beginning, Sen’s concern was linked to his disagreement with a somewhat tacit 
public consensus around the articulation of public policies seeking to equalize perceptions of 
Outcomes / 
Advantages: yi 
     Effort: ei Circumstances: xi 
Public Policies: p 
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individual satisfaction, as mandates utilitarianism and/or the equalization of basic goods (which 
include individual liberties and material resources), as suggested by Rawlsian prescription. 
According to Sen, the concept of equality of resources fails to take into account differences 
amongst individuals in terms of needs, desires and abilities, which, as we have stressed before, 
he considers to be fundamental for understanding individual wellbeing and, ultimately, social 
justice. Indeed, for Sen, the concept of individual wellbeing is far too complex and rich to be 
merged solely with the concepts of wealth or utility (satisfaction) and, above all, to be considered 
one-dimensional.  
Among development scholars and policymakers, Sen’s ideas have greatly overpowered 
other approaches to wellbeing, such as the monetary approach that sees consumption capacities 
as a synonym of wellbeing (Ruggeri-Laderchi et al., 2003) and the neoclassical welfarist point of 
view that focuses on the concept of utility, synonym of individual perception of satisfaction, thus 
as wellbeing (Blackorby & Bossert, 2008; Schokkaert, 2007). Although consumption capacities are 
an important part of wellbeing and the concept of utility, being the basic pillar of neoclassical 
microeconomics, constitutes one of the most useful constructions in welfare economics, it is clear 
that they have important limitations for wellbeing and social justice analyses (Alkire & Foster, 
2011). Neither concept pays attention to the underlying factors from which those rational choices 
emerge because they are essentially one-dimensional (Robeyns, 2006), thus, offering a ‘thin 
informational basis’ (Anand et al., 2009) for wellbeing assessment. Sen has contributed greatly to 
today’s consensus that wellbeing is essentially multidimensional (Alkire & Foster, 2011; 
Ravallion, 2010, 2012; Ura et al., 2012).  
By virtue of the CA, it is now accepted that personal capability sets should be the measure of 
individual wellbeing; but the latter is difficult to directly observe given its counterfactual nature. 
In general, studies on the measurement of capabilities fall under two categories: a) studies that 
directly measure capability sets through questionnaires on people’s choices and functionings 
(e.g. Anand et al., 2005, 2009; Anand & van Hees, 2006), and b) studies that consider the observed 
functionings as partial manifestations of the capability set and resort to latent variable 
methodology for making inferences on capability sets using the observed indicators as well as 
other exogenous determinants of capabilities (e.g. Anand et al., 2010; Di Tommaso, 2007; 
Krishnakumar, 2007;  Krishnakumar & Ballón, 2008).  
The same richness in perspective regarding individual wellbeing is not explicit in Roemer’s 
work, nor is there an explicit recognition of lifestyle heterogeneity. Thus the search for equality 
of opportunity in the original sense of Roemer (1998) does not provide suitable elements for 
answering the question at hand in this section. Let us present the following arguments 
supporting this affirmation.  
First, even if the EOp is as critical as the CA of utilitarianism as a theoretical basis for 
appraising social justice , it has mainly tended to consider one-dimensional outcomes such as 
education, health or wealth, except for a very few recent empirical operationalizations with 
multidimensional observable outcomes. Perhaps some of the most prominent amongst the latter 
are Yalonetzky’s (2012) efforts to create a Dissimilarity Index for inequality assessment, 
Wendelspeiss’ (2013) multidimensional latent variable approach and Brunori, Ferreira & 
Peragine’s (2013) international comparisons of inequality of opportunity. These exceptions aside, 
the vast majority of empirical applications of EOp follow the traditional Romerian flow by 
proposing one specific outcome for equalization in the quest for social justice and only one at a 
time (Igersheim, 2006). 
Second, we perceive a clear distinction between the concepts of opportunity and capability. 
On the one hand, as suggested by the EOp, an opportunity is a situation that presents itself to an 
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individual making use of which, and depending on her own efforts and skills, she will be able to 
achieve a certain outcome or lifestyle. Thus opportunities are not individual but common to a 
group of individuals that share the same circumstances (i.e. to each type in Roemer’s 
terminology). On the other hand, the CA stresses that the concept of capability is unequivocally 
individual and personal. The concepts of opportunity and capability, therefore, operate at 
different levels of measurement and only the latter tend to take into account individual 
heterogeneity.   
Third, according to the EOp, every member of a certain type can seize opportunities without 
distinction between each other. In effect, the only difference in terms of outcome between 
individuals of the same type is their effort and therefore, their own responsibility (Roemer, 1998). 
However, building on the CA, we stress that each individual always seizes opportunities 
differently from another, and that each individual personally (although, also influenced by 
factors other than personal) forms her own set of capabilities. 
Let us close this section illustrating the superiority of the CA to answer our first question by 
virtue of its multidimensional and individually heterogeneous conception of wellbeing.  In 
practice, it is usual to target a specific aspect of wellbeing when designing and implementing a 
public policy. However, spillovers around the target are undeniable and should never be left 
aside, for to do so would imply a drastic underestimation of the impact and blur possible ways 
of improving or correcting the policy. Take for instance a public policy aiming to improve 
nutrition of children aged 0-6, such as a complementary nutrition program. The impacts of such 
a policy go far beyond the children’s nutrition status as measured, for instance, by ratios 
combining variables such as height, weight and age; it enhances learning possibilities, 
recreational capacities and opportunities to develop talents in sports, music and so on, all of 
which are unobservable aspects of the children’s wellbeing and all of which will always be 
imperfectly captured, even when resorting to multidimensional observable outcomes 
assessment. Furthermore, the children’s wellbeing is undeniably influenced by the 
characteristics, values, culture and habits of their households and few would agree these 
important characteristics can be taken as homogeneous within a certain type, say, female 
indigenous children living in rural areas. 
Therefore, in view of the fact that we adopt the CA in defining wellbeing as the freedom to 
achieve, which is in turn represented by the capability set, we would like to posit the idea that 
capability sets (i.e. potential functionings) and not achieved functionings or outcomes should be 
the object of equalization in the quest for social justice. We stand by this argument, even if 
capability sets are heterogeneous and may not be directly observed due to their ‘potential’ nature, 
thus posing a formidable challenge for practical purposes. Policy assessment and design based 
only on EOp leaves important theoretical gaps concerning suitable answers to our first question. 
 
4. Which social states are better/more just and should be promoted by public action? 
Once one establishes that the appropriate concept of wellbeing is the capability set, it is clear that 
an expansion and, ideally, an equalization of individuals’ capability sets should be the ultimate 
social objective for development. Turning to the second question that guides us through this 
paper, the CA, by itself, falls short; it does not go further to elaborate on actual ways of achieving 
these goals. Sen (2009) himself has stated:  
“The capability perspective does point to the central relevance of the inequality of 
capabilities in the assessment of social disparities, but it does not, on its own, propose any 
specific formula for public decisions” (p. 232).  
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The CA’s major strengths, namely the broadness and the context-based character of the 
framework that it offers, might just be its weakness in terms of its lack of possible suggestions on 
what can or should be done to increase social justice. The CA limits itself to advocating for the 
equalization of capabilities as a normative rule for social justice, implying that a fair distribution 
of potential functionings amongst members of a society ought to be the public goal (Fleurbaey, 
2007). The need for further elements other than those depicted in the CA is evident for giving a 
plausible answer to our second question. 
We stress that these elements cannot come from traditional normative prescriptions inspired 
from neoclassical welfare economics. Although they are deeply influential for choosing the 
‘right’ social states, these prescriptions rely heavily on the extrapolation of the notion of 
individual utility to that of social utility. General equilibrium modeling fits well as a widely 
known example of such practice (Devarajan & Robinson, 2002). This Arrovian view on social 
choice has also been criticized for having a thin informational basis, focusing exclusively on 
individuals’ satisfaction or happiness for the maximization of some aggregation of the latter, 
prior to the search for the best allocations of lifestyle outcomes. Because of these facts, we argue 
that traditional normative and theoretical schemes from neoclassical welfare economics are 
clearly unsuitable supplements to the CA in the sense described in the introductory paragraphs 
by Robeyns (see the quotation in Section 1, with own emphasis). 
According to Pignataro (2012), the last 15 years have witnessed a notable revolution in terms 
of thinking about social justice and what should be perceived as a fair social state and how to 
promote it. Roemer’s EOp (Roemer, 1998) stands out in this evolution of thinking and in our 
opinion provides a suitable supplement to the CA. In the remainder of this section, let us present 
ordered arguments supporting this idea and formally identify the elements of the EOp that are 
compatible with the CA’s rationale. 
The principal ideal of EOp is to achieve a social state in which circumstances do not bear any 
influence on people’s outcomes, either directly or indirectly through influences over the efforts 
people make to achieve them. This irrelevance of circumstances is a condition for a Romerian 
leveling of the playing field conception of social justice. This just society may be utopic, but this way 
of thinking has undeniably shed a clear light on plausible governmental interventions to promote 
this ideal. For instance, Roemer et al. (2003) have assessed the extent to which reigning fiscal 
regimes in eleven countries contribute to equalizing opportunities for income acquisition based 
on the EOp approach. Also based on this approach, but within a different empirical framework 
and operational model, Betts and Roemer (2005) have analyzed the contribution of an 
educational finance reform in the USA to the equalization of opportunities for education. Indeed, 
in the EOp there exists a notion of optimal public policy for social justice, and it is one entailing 
equality of opportunities to achieve a certain outcome. 
Today, the discussion on the selection of such socially optimal public policies is of great 
importance in academic circles (Pignataro, 2012). According to Ramos and Van de Gaer (2012), 
there are two conflicting practical programs for identifying EOp optimal public policies. The first 
was proposed by Roemer himself in 1998 and aims to eliminate inequality of outcomes for 
individuals exerting the same effort, regardless of their type. This program is called ex-post 
equality of opportunity.  
Mathematically, the operationalization of ex-post equality of opportunity builds directly on 
Rawls’ prescription of focusing on the least advantaged people. According to the ex-post EOp, 
the optimal public policy is formed by a set of specific public actions 𝑝𝜋, where 𝜋 is a centile of 
the effort distributions of all types, so that every 𝑝𝜋  maximizes the outcome of the least 
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advantaged individuals having exerted the same degree of effort 𝜋  in all types. Using the 
notation introduced before, this is formalized by:    
max
𝑝𝜋
min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
𝑦𝑡(𝜋, 𝑝𝜋)                                                               (4) 
Evidently, as it is impractical to find an optimal public policy for every centile, Roemer invokes 
outcome-based tools to define a single optimal public policy compatible with social justice, p, as 
the one that helps achieving maximization of the average advantage of the least favored across 
every degree of effort. Formally, this policy solves the following optimization program:  
max
𝑝
  ∑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝜋  min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
𝑦𝑡(𝜋, 𝑝𝜋)         or     max
𝑝
 𝐸[min𝑡   𝑦𝑡(𝜋, 𝑝𝜋)]                       (5) 
The arguments that we have presented make it clear that this program is too heavily centered on 
outcomes, leading to clear theoretical incompatibilities with the CA. As the ex-post program is 
the original program proposed by Roemer, this is perhaps one of the reasons economic and 
human development scholars have neither insistently pushed forward to build a mix of Sen’s 
and Roemer’s theories, nor searched for empirical endeavors founded on such a possible mix. In 
effect, this program compares outcomes across individuals and explicitly seeks to pull the least 
advantaged individuals upwards, identifying these people based on their outcomes. The ex-post 
framework follows the compensation principle, suggesting public policies that contribute to the 
equalization of outcomes for individuals exerting the same level of effort under different 
circumstances (Pignataro, 2012). 
There is, however, a second program for achieving equality of opportunity, whose 
advancement is generally attributed in the literature to Van de Gaer (see e.g. Van de Gaer (1993); 
Ramos & Van de Gaer (2012)) and which is concerned with the equalization of prospects of 
outcomes for every individual, regardless of their type. This program is called ex-ante equality of 
opportunity and it advocates in favor of a policy allowing the maximization of the prospects of 
outcomes (potential outcome) of the least advantaged type in a society, as measured by the 
average of the outcomes over all the members of that type: 
max
𝑝
 min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
∑𝜋 𝑦𝑡(𝜋, 𝑝𝜋)        or    max
𝑝
 min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝜋 [𝑦𝑡(𝜋, 𝑝𝜋)]                       (6) 
Even if the formalization of this program differs only on the inversion of the sum and min 
operators, the implications for a conceptual compatibility between the EOp approach and the CA 
are of paramount importance. In the ex-ante approach, the degree or level of effort are to be left 
unobserved, as was proposed in the original Romerian EOp conception, but remains what 
ultimately determines the differences of outcomes within a type; it respects individual 
heterogeneity. The ex-ante program builds on the reward principle of analyzing differences in 
outcomes for individuals under the same circumstances (Pignataro, 2012). Implicitly, there 
should not be any kind of public intervention attempting to equalize outcomes that originate 
from each individual’s responsibility.  
Therefore the answer to our second question is that public policies should foster equality of 
opportunity, conceived as a situation where sets of possible outcomes are the same for every type 
within a society. Furthermore, policy priority is given to pulling up the least-advantaged type 
distribution of outcomes and for that, it is a Rawlsian conception of equality of opportunity.  
 
5. Combination 
Based on the preceding discussion, we propose to deepen the consideration of individual 
capability sets as the multidimensional unobserved outcome of an EOp-based theoretical 
framework in the quest for policymaking for wellbeing with justice. We believe that this 
constitutes another step forward in the operationalization of the CA for policymaking. 
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We propose the conceptual scheme in Figure 3 below to represent the theoretical linkages 
that will be highlighted in this section. 
 
Figure 3: Scheme of a Capability Approach-Based Equality of Opportunity Framework 
 
 
Let us start our reasoning and the explanation of the scheme recalling that wellbeing, measured 
by the capability set, is multidimensional and intrinsically unobservable due to its counterfactual 
nature and, according to EOp, it is determined by individual efforts, which are also unobservable 
and reflect an individual sense of responsibility. Thus efforts are essential for understanding 
wellbeing, as is emphasized by Roemer throughout his work (Roemer, 1998; Roemer et al., 2003; 
see also Betts & Roemer, 2005). Nevertheless, in most empirical EOp-based work the amount of 
effort exerted by a person has been treated as a residual error term, with no further consideration 
for its estimation (see for example Bourguignon et al., 2007; Cogneau & Gignoux, 2008; Roemer 
et al., 2003). Therefore the combination that we propose introduces a causal relationship between 
unobservable or latent variables that remains empirically understudied in public policy and 
economic development literature and we make the case that it can deliver important results for 
understanding and assessing the role of public policies for wellbeing. 
We postulate the existence of a two-way relationship between capabilities and efforts, which 
together lead to multiple achieved outcomes or functionings, thus capturing the CA’s 
multidimensional essence. We argue that efforts are shaped by capabilities by virtue of the 
individual nature of the decision-making process on efforts. We reason that potential feasible 
lifestyle outcomes of a person configure the practical choices and actions she makes in order to 
achieve the outcomes that suit her best, according to her needs, tastes and desires. Efforts, in turn, 
can affect capabilities by bringing in more potential outcomes within the capability set, 
expanding lifestyle possibilities for people to choose from. 
Both efforts and capabilities are in turn influenced by individual characteristics and 
surrounding features, called circumstances. These include: i) individual characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity and age; ii) other multilevel aspects concerning a) family and household, such 
as the composition, living conditions, religion and culture and b) community, such as the 
environment, the language spoken, or the level of local economic development. In our 
combination, public policies are also a part of the environment as the CA mandates, and 
according to the ex-ante framework of the EOp such policies should aim at equalizing 
opportunities by reducing the role played by circumstances beyond one’s control in the 
determination of capabilities and efforts. Thus public policies may not explicitly shape 
Public Policies 
Individual characteristics 
Achieved Functionings or 
outcomes /advantages 
Capabilitiesi 
Effortsi 
Family and community 
factors 
(social circumstances) 
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circumstances such as gender, household composition or language spoken in the community, 
but they do shape the extent to which these circumstances affect an individual’s capabilities and 
efforts.  
 Thus, building on Rawlsian maximin rationale, which states that a society would achieve 
justice and equality when prospects of life for the least fortunate are as great as they can be 
(Rawls, 1971, 1999), an optimal policy for equalization of capability sets across types 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇 
would be given by: 
max
𝑝
min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
∑ 𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝑖∈𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑡
    or      max
𝑝
 𝐸𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛                                                        (7) 
where 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the capability set of the i-th individual belonging to type 𝑡 and 𝐸𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the average 
capability set of the least advantaged type.  
Here we would like to recall some key equations introduced by Sen (1985) for defining 
capabilities so that we are clear as to what is being maximized. Let 𝑥𝑖 be the commodity vector 
possessed by an individual 𝑖. The individual makes use of the characteristics of the commodities 
in order to 'convert' the resources into a functioning, i.e a 'being' or a 'doing'. We take the term 
'commodity' in a large sense, including personal resources as well as social and institutional 
infra-structural support or circumstances, i.e all that enters the conversion process. The 
conversion function is written as: 
bi = 𝑓𝑖(𝑐(𝑥𝑖))                                                                                         (8) 
Note that given the same 𝑥𝑖 achieved functioning can be different from one individual to another 
due to the dependence of f on i as personal characteristics such as age, gender, health status, 
tastes, and the effort put in by the individual, all of which play an important role in the 
conversion process. The set of all functionings that can be potentially achieved using the 
commodity vector is called the capability set:  
𝑄𝑖 = {𝑏𝑖|𝑏𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑐(𝑥𝑖)), for some 𝑓𝑖 and for some 𝑥𝑖}                                            (9) 
Thus we are not maximizing utility in (7), neither are we maximizing resources or outcomes 
(achieved functionings). It is indeed the set of feasible functionings of an individual, in other 
words her freedom to achieve valued things in life, which we seek to maximize in our approach. 
In our setting, each individual i belongs to a type t and hence every individual will have a 
double index i,t from now on. As expressed in equation (7), our optimal policy for wellbeing with 
justice is one which maximizes the capability sets (feasible outcomes) for the least favored. In our 
model, the capability set depends on personal circumstances and efforts, and the efforts 
themselves can in turn be influenced by circumstances. Thus 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(𝑥𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡(𝑥𝑖,𝑡))                                                                               (10) 
where circumstances are included in 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the effort. In Roemer's reasoning, the 
most disadvantaged type identifies the least favored and hence it represents a group rather than 
a single individual. Thus we take the expected feasible outcome (or the expected capability set) 
of the least favored type as our objective function in order to be consistent with the ex-ante EOp 
approach. Then the optimization program can be written as: 
max
𝑝
min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
𝐸 [𝑄𝑖,𝑡 (𝑥𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡(𝑥𝑖,𝑡)) |𝑥𝑖,𝑡]                                              (11) 
For simplicity of notation, let us denote the expectation as:  
𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  ≡  𝐸 [𝑄𝑖,𝑡 (𝑥𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑖,𝑡(𝑥𝑖,𝑡)) |𝑥𝑖,𝑡]                                                                       
and the minimum as: 
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𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≡ min
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡                                                                                     (12) 
In a very general setting, 𝐸 [𝑄𝑖,𝑡 (𝑥𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡(𝑥𝑖,𝑡)) |𝑥𝑖,𝑡]  can be different from one individual to 
another and hence we keep the index i in the expectation. Thus the ‘optimal’ policy will be given 
by 𝑝∗𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛 such that 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛 is maximum
2, i.e. we should have   
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑝
= 0 at 𝑝 =  𝑝∗𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛 . Note 
that the solution could also vary from one type to another. Thus, 𝑝∗𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛  denotes the optimal 
policy applied to an individual i belonging to the least favored type3. 
Now, rather than deriving the optimal policy, if we want to see how effective a policy is in 
promoting EOp (or reducing inequality of opportunity) following Roemer's idea, we can 
evaluate to what extent the policy is able to change the impact of a generic circumstance variable 
𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛 of an individual i belonging to the least favored type on her expected capability set 𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
The effect of circumstance for the least favored type can be computed as: 
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
=
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
+
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
                                                   (13) 
where the derivatives are to be calculated using equation (10). Let us denote:  
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
=  
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛) ≡ 𝑔𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛)                                        (14) 
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
=  
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛) ≡ ℎ𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛)                                               (15) 
The first function above depicts the direct impact of circumstances on expected capability sets 
and the second depicts their indirect impact through effort. Thus the total effect of circumstances 
as a function of public policies is given by:  
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝑔𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛) +
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛) ≡ 𝑘𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛)        (16) 
Therefore, the condition that a public policy must fulfill in order to be EOp-optimal, i.e. to nullify 
the effect of circumstances on expected capability sets for the least favored type, is given by: 
 𝑘𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑝
∗
𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 0                                                                                      (17) 
denoting this optimal policy as 𝑝∗𝑖,𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Now, if we would like to derive the optimal policy for any type t in general and not 
necessarily the least favored one, we would just need to replace 'min' by 't' in the above derivation 
and the optimal policy would then be given by 𝑝∗𝑖,𝑡 such that: 
𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (𝑝
∗
𝑖,𝑡) = 0                                                                                                   (18) 
with  
𝑘𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑖,𝑡) ≡
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡
 = 𝑔𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑖,𝑡)                                         (19) 
As an illustration we present a case in which the above relations take a linear form, the policy 
value is common to all individuals belonging to a given type, and the coefficients are also 
invariant within a given type. Let 
𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡𝑝𝑡) + 𝑒′𝑖,𝑡(𝐶𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡𝑝𝑡) + 𝑧′𝑖𝐹𝑡                                   (20) 
                                                 
2 A policy p has an impact on wellbeing through its influence on the effect of circumstance variables on capabilities or 
efforts (see later). 
3 In practice, the policy variable will probably take the same value for all individuals belonging to the same type. 
However, here we present a very general theoretical setting in which it can vary from one individual to another.   
Public policies for wellbeing with justice  
Krishnakumar & Nogales 
 
www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 57 
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖,𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝑧′𝑖𝐻𝑡                                                                                       (21) 
(where 𝑧′𝑖 represents a vector of personal characteristics) 
Then, 
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑔𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑡) +
𝜕𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑒𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑡) ≡ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑡) = 𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡𝑝𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡(𝐶𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡𝑝𝑡)    (22) 
and the optimal policy is 𝑝𝑡
∗ such that:  
𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝐺(𝐶𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡𝑝𝑡
∗) = 0                                                                          (23) 
Let us stress that the observable aspects of a person's lifestyle, call them either outcomes or 
functionings, are not the essence of the optimization program. The reason is two-fold. First, they 
are not a person's wellbeing according to the CA but only partial manifestations of her wellbeing. 
Second, a person's actual lifestyle is ultimately a personal choice. In other words, we advocate for 
a theoretical framework in which public policies do not directly aim at influencing a person's 
lifestyle but act in an indirect way by promoting the enabling factors of capabilities and efforts 
(potential lifestyles), leaving the actual choice to the individual, thus respecting her freedom. 
In order to clarify the difference between the proposed theoretical framework and separate 
EOp and CA-based theoretical frameworks, let us consider the following example. There are 
important public policies, more precisely social policies, built around conditional cash transfers 
for students, that aim to diminish rates of school abandonment, increase their academic 
performance and ultimately, their wellbeing and promote justice within society (Bolivia’s Bono 
Juancito Pinto is an example of such a policy, see Yañez, 2012). In this concrete case, the two 
questions that have guided our discussion could take the following form: 
1) What are we making less unequal through this conditional transfer? 
2) What is the adequate amount for the cash transfer to promote equality? 
A plausible answer to the first question from a ‘pure’ EOp perspective would state that one needs 
to identify one observable outcome or advantage enjoyed by the beneficiaries that has a link to 
the cash transfer, say the schooling gap, defined as the difference between the years of schooling 
a person should have given her age and her actual years of schooling. This variable would 
constitute the proxy of opportunities for education and ultimately wellbeing, which is what the cash 
transfer aims at equalizing.  
A traditional EOp-based theoretical framework adopting an ex-ante program for equality of 
opportunity would bring about an answer to the second question stressing that the cash transfer 
has a direct impact on the expected schooling gap. It would go on to advocate for seeking an 
amount of the transfer so that expected schooling gap is minimized (i.e. opportunities for 
education are maximized) for the least favored type of people, say indigenous females. Within 
this type, schooling gap differences, i.e. wellbeing differences, would then be the absolute 
responsibility of the beneficiaries or fruit of their efforts, as they all are supposed to share the 
same circumstances.  
A traditional CA-based framework would stress that schooling gap is a rather oversimplified 
proxy of the beneficiaries’ wellbeing and that the latter should be measured, for instance, as their 
capability to be educated (not to be confused with individuals’ inherent abilities like intelligence). 
A single observed outcome for gauging such a broad concept is clearly insufficient and 
unnecessary; the policy might also influence other aspects of wellbeing that can be observed, 
such as the ability to read and to understand abstract logic reasoning (by increasing the 
possibility of buying more books using the extra cash and/or hiring a tutor) or the ability to read 
foreign languages (by increasing the possibility of entering a language institute). The CA would 
go on to stress that the actual schooling gap is, to some extent, a choice among other feasible 
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options of the beneficiaries. Thus it would suggest only an indirect impact of the cash transfer on 
the schooling gap, through the expansion of the beneficiaries’ capability to be educated. 
However, due to the absence of any prescriptions regarding how to go about achieving 
equality of opportunity in these multidimensional aspects, the CA does not give a plausible 
answer for the second question apart from the statement: the greater the capability to be educated 
for all beneficiaries, the better.  
The combination that we propose would in fact lead to a precise and operational answer to 
both the questions combining remarkable elements of both approaches. To answer the first 
question, the combined approach would advocate for the multiplicity of outcomes for gauging 
wellbeing, inheriting the logic of the CA that we just presented. Not only would our approach 
take into account the multidimensional aspect of wellbeing, but it would also respect the 
beneficiaries’ freedom to choose, suggesting only an indirect influence of the transfer over all 
outcomes.  
To answer the second question, our combination would inherit the rationale of the EOp, 
arguing in favor of the equalization of capability to be educated by searching for an amount of 
the transfer that maximizes this capability for the ‘least capable’ across different types and ideally 
annuls the effect of circumstances on the capability of being educated. The combination would 
not suggest an equalization of any outcome, in respect of individual’s freedom to choose. 
Furthermore, the search of this adequate amount of transfer would not let effort be considered as 
a residual variable; it is an important determinant of actual outcomes. Effort would be, at least, 
partially gauged by some observable indicators, such as daily hours of study and frequency of 
visits to the school library. Thus effort would not be considered as an absolute personal 
responsibility; each of the effort indicators that we mention is surely influenced by the 
beneficiaries’ capability to be educated and the converse is also true. 
  
6. Concluding Remarks  
The quest for improved collective wellbeing with justice has always been a priority for most of 
the economic and political constructs that we know of. In this paper, we have attempted to show 
that there exist powerful philosophical and theoretical frameworks that contain important 
elements, which can and should be combined to come up with operational answers to this 
question. In particular, we rely on two theories that have recently gained an overwhelmingly 
increasing visibility in academic and policy circles, namely the Capability Approach and the 
Equality of Opportunity approach.  
One of the main contributions we want to make in this paper is to put on the table some 
ordered arguments for the fact that neither of these leading theories alone possesses sufficient 
theoretical elements to guide policymaking for wellbeing with justice. Thus we advocate for a 
theoretical construction that builds on these two approaches to provide insight on how to design 
and evaluate policies for improvement of wellbeing with social justice. We show how the 
similarities and differences between the two approaches are complementary to each other and 
how they can help to set a solid theoretical basis for the assessment and design of public policies 
that seek to improve social justice. Consequently, there are ways to explore the issue without 
having to build an entirely new approach. The particular manner in which we propose to 
combine the two theories has, to our knowledge, not been explored in the related literature. 
We show that the ex-post framework of the Equality of Opportunity approach, which is its 
original conception, is too heavily centered on people’s lifestyle outcomes, with too little 
theoretical consideration for individual heterogeneity and choice. However, the ex-ante 
framework of the Equality of Opportunity approach depicts elements that are compatible with 
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the logic of the Capability Approach, in the sense that both respect individual heterogeneity and 
freedom, and do not aim at equalization of results as a social justice paradigm.  
In the combination that is proposed, we argue for the need to explicitly consider the role of 
efforts while analyzing public policies and their link to wellbeing and justice. Indeed, the line of 
reasoning that we present makes the case that individual efforts influence and are influenced by 
individual capabilities, but to our knowledge, there are no theoretical attempts in the existing 
literature to relate these two key variables in the understanding of wellbeing. Efforts have often 
been treated as a residual variable in most empirical applications of the Equality of Opportunity 
approach, due to its unobservable nature. We stress that this is not an insurmountable obstacle 
as, even if potential achievements cannot be observed due to their counterfactual nature, there are 
empirical endeavors that have successfully taken account of this feature in their 
operationalization methodology. A similar approach can also be followed for operationalizing 
‘effort’. In other words, technical difficulties for gauging bidirectional causal relations between 
unobservable variables should not hinder theoretical developments that can shed important light 
for understanding wellbeing and its relation to public policies.  
Therefore, while designing and assessing public policies, one needs to target and equalize 
capability sets of individuals, rather than their outcomes. This is done through a maximin 
algorithm that maximizes the capability set of the group that is the least favored in terms of 
circumstances while taking into account the influence of circumstances and policies on 
capabilities and efforts, and explicitly incorporating interdependencies between the latter two 
variables. We define this ‘well-being with justice’ problem in a technical way and discuss the 
solution from an optimal public policy angle.  
We are aware that the main challenges for the empirical application of our theoretical 
framework concern the development of a rigorous econometric model that helps to identify the 
complex structural relations that we have proposed in this paper, as well as the existence and 
quality of adequate information for its implementation. Nevertheless, we believe that these 
challenges should be faced and we intend to attempt a practical implementation of our 
framework in a future study, as we are convinced that the theoretical discussion, although 
enriching, needs to be strengthened by empirical investigations. 
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